WASHINGTON
— On his second yearlong deployment to Afghanistan, Lt.
Col. Daniel L. Davis traveled 9,000 miles, patrolled with American troops in
eight provinces and returned in October of last year with a fervent conviction
that the war was going disastrously and that senior military leaders had not
leveled with the American public.
Since enlisting in
the Army in 1985, he said, he had repeatedly seen top commanders falsely dress
up a dismal situation. But this time, he would not let it rest. So he consulted
with his pastor at McLean Bible Church in Virginia, where
he sings in the choir. He watched his favorite movie, “Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington,” one more time, drawing inspiration from Jimmy Stewart’s role as the extraordinary ordinary
man who takes on a
corrupt establishment.
And then, late last
month, Colonel Davis, 48, began an unusual one-man campaign of military
truth-telling. He wrote two reports, one unclassified and the other classified,
summarizing his observations on the candor gap with respect to
Afghanistan. He briefed four members of Congress and a
dozen staff members, spoke with a reporter for The New York Times, sent his
reports to the Defense Department’s inspector general — and only then informed
his chain of command that he had done so.
“How many more men
must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding?“ Colonel Davis asks
in an article summarizing his views titled “Truth, Lies and
Afghanistan: How Military Leaders Have Let Us Down.” It was published online Sunday in The Armed
Forces Journal, the nation’s oldest independent periodical on military affairs.
“No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan,” he says in the
article. “But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying
deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going
on.”
Colonel Davis says
his experience has caused him to doubt reports of progress in the war from
numerous military leaders, including David H. Petraeus,
who commanded the troops in Afghanistan before becoming the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in
June.
Last March, for
example, Mr. Petraeus, then an Army general, testified before the Senate that
the Taliban’s momentum had been “arrested in much of the country” and that
progress was “significant,” though fragile, and “on the right azimuth” to allow
Afghan forces to take the lead in combat by the end of
2014.
Colonel Davis
fiercely disputes such assertions and says few of the troops believe them. At
the same time, he is acutely aware of the chasm in stature that separates him
from those he is criticizing, and he has no illusions about the impact his
public stance may have on his career.
“I’m going to get
nuked,“ he said in an interview last month.
But his bosses’
initial response has been restrained. They told him that while they disagreed
with him, he would not face “adverse action,” he said.
Col. James E.
Hutton, chief of media relations for the Army, declined to comment specifically
about Colonel Davis, but he rejected the idea that military leaders had been
anything but truthful about
Afghanistan.
“We are a
values-based organization, and the integrity of what we publish and what we say
is something we take very seriously,” he said.
A spokeswoman for
Mr. Petraeus, Jennifer Youngblood of the C.I.A., said he “has demonstrated that
he speaks truth to power in each of his leadership positions over the past
several years. His record should stand on its own, as should LTC
Davis’ analysis.”
If the official
reaction to Colonel Davis’s campaign has been subdued, it may be partly because
he has recruited a few supporters among the war skeptics on Capitol
Hill.
“For Colonel Davis
to go out on a limb and help us to understand what’s happening on the ground, I
have the greatest admiration for him,“ said Representative Walter B. Jones,
Republican of North Carolina, who has met with Colonel Davis twice and read his
reports.
Senator Jeff
Merkley, Democrat of Oregon, one of four senators who met with Colonel Davis
despite what he called “a lot of resistance from the Pentagon,” said the colonel
was a valuable witness because his extensive travels and midlevel rank gave him
access to a wide range of soldiers.
Moreover, Colonel
Davis’s doubts about reports of progress in the war are widely shared, if not
usually voiced in public by officers on duty. Just last week, Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Democrat of California and chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, said at a hearing that she was
“concerned by what appears to be a disparity”between public
testimony about progress in Afghanistan and “the bleaker description” in a
classified National Intelligence
Estimate produced in
December, which was described in news reports as “sobering” and
“dire.”
Those words would
also describe Colonel Davis’s account of what he saw in
Afghanistan, the latest assignment in a military career
that has included clashes with some commanders, but glowing evaluations from
others. (“His maturity, tenacity and judgment can be counted on in even the
hardest of situations, and his devotion to mission accomplishment is unmatched
by his peers,” says an evaluation from May that concludes that he has “unlimited
potential.”)
Colonel Davis, a son
of a high school football coach in Dallas and who is known
as Danny, served two years as an Army private before returning to Texas Tech and
completing the Reserve Officer Training Corps program. He served in
Germany and fought in the first Iraq war before
joining the Reserve and working civilian jobs, including a year as a member of
the Senate staff.
After the Sept. 11
attacks, he returned to active duty, serving a tour in Iraq as well as the two
in Afghanistan and spending 15 months working on Future Combat
Systems, an ambitious Army program to produce high-tech
vehicles linked to drones and sensors. On that program, too, he said, commanders
kept promising success despite ample evidence of trouble. The program was shut
down in 2009 after an investment of billions of
dollars.
In his recent tour
in Afghanistan, Colonel Davis represented the Army’s Rapid
Equipping Force, created to bypass a cumbersome bureaucracy to make sure the
troops quickly get the gear they need.
He spoke with about
250 soldiers, from 19-year-old privates to division commanders, as well as
Afghan security officials and civilians, he said. From the Americans, he heard
contempt for the cowardice and double-dealing of their Afghan counterparts. From
Afghans, he learned of unofficial nonaggression pacts between
Afghanistan’s security forces and Taliban
fighters.
When he was in
rugged Kunar Province, an Afghan police officer
visiting his parents was kidnapped by the Taliban and killed. “That was in
visual range of an American base,” he said. “Their influence didn’t even reach
as far as they could see.”
Some of the soldiers
he interviewed were later killed, a fact that shook him and that he mentions
in videos he shot in Afghanistan and later posted on
YouTube. At home, he pored over the statements of military
leaders, including General Petraeus. He found them at odds with what he had
seen, with classified intelligence reports and with casualty
statistics.
“You can spin all
kinds of stuff,” Colonel Davis said. “But you can’t spin the fact that more men
are getting blown up every year.”
Colonel Davis can
come across as strident, labeling as lies what others might call wishful
thinking. Matthew M. Aid, a historian who examines
Afghanistan in his new book “Intel
Wars,” says that
while there is a “yawning gap” between Pentagon statements and intelligence
assessments, “it’s oversimplified to say the top brass are out-and-out lying.
They are just too close to the subject.”
But Martin L. Cook, who
teaches military ethics at the Naval War College, says Colonel Davis has identified a hazard that is
intrinsic to military culture, in which a can-do optimism can be at odds with
the strictest candor when a mission is failing.
“You’ve trained
people to try to be successful even when half their buddies are dead and they’re
almost out of ammo,” he said. “It’s very hard for them to say, ‘can’t
do.’ ”
Mr. Cook said it was
rare for an officer of Colonel Davis’s modest rank to “decide that he knows
better” and to go to Congress and the news media.
“It may be an act of
moral courage,” he said. “But he’s gone outside channels, and he’s taking his
chances on what happens to him.”