London
Published: November 5 2003 20:26 | Last Updated: November 5 2003 20:26
A decade ago, a young US lieutenant colonel who had just returned from Iraq leading an army battalion on peacekeeping duties decided to write down his thoughts on how difficult the mission was - and what he had learned about making such operations better.
"A peacekeeping mission is often viewed as being essentially static," he wrote. "Instead, the battalion found itself in an extremely dynamic, fluid situation which required constant offensive manoeuvre to evict the Iraqis from an expanding security zone."
His conclusion? "We need to understand that peacekeeping is dangerous, stressful duty that requires highly disciplined, well-educated soldiers who understand the nature of the peacekeeping beast."
More than 10 years after those peacekeeping duties in northern Iraq following Operation Desert Storm, that lieutenant colonel - John Abizaid - is a four-star general commanding all coalition forces inside Iraq. And with the recent rash of Ramadan attacks, new questions are being asked about whether the forces he commands are losing the war over the peace.
"The increasing ratio of US wounded to killed and increases in the number of attacks inevitably interacts with extended deployments to affect both morale and operations," says Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
"Morale impact is not measured simply in the death of other people, but how many fellow soldiers are directly threatened and wounded, the sense of personal risk and feelings of mission accomplishment versus mission futility."
But despite suffering the bloodiest day at the weekend since the end of major combat operations, and despite a seemingly growing guerrilla campaign against US forces, co-operating Iraqis and international aid groups, many analysts believe recent incidents may be a last gasp for Ba'athist insurgents before, as one senior Pentagon official put it, they "flame out".
Several military analysts note that unlike insurgent wars in places such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, where superpowers were forced into ignominious retreats, there is no state sponsorship of the guerrilla forces, meaning their access to weapons and supplies is limited.
"No guerrilla war is easy," says Karl Zinsmeister, an analyst with the American Enterprise Institute. "But I want to point out, there is no Ho Chi Minh trail pumping poison into Iraq. There can be none, and with each passing season, there will be fewer weapons and fewer guerrillas and less money to finance those operations."
People briefed by senior commanders in Iraq say that in addition to the capture of regime leaders, US counter-insurgency forces have made progress on capturing Iraqis on their second-tier lists and middle-level Ba'athists. There are suggestions they may have been less successful in tracking down home-grown and foreign Islamist extremists.
Still, analysts warn, the last gasp could be a long one even if no new weapons are reaching rebels in significant numbers.
Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst with the Brookings Institution, argues US forces have been negligent in securing arms caches left over from the previous regime.
"There are many complexes measuring several square miles where enormous amounts of ammunition are still found in Iraq, many of which are not being sufficiently secured by coalition armed forces," he said.
As to popular support for the fighters, early polling shows little support for Ba'athists or jihadis.
A Gallup poll in September found that close to two-thirds of Iraqis believed ousting Saddam Hussein had been worth the hard-ships.
"There is not going to be a Ba'ath party revival," Mr Zinsmeister argues, noting that the influx of US funding that will follow the passage of the US administration's $87bn aid package should reinforce this.
"The data are very clear that Saddam is extremely unpopular, [as are] his associates." Mr O'Hanlon said: "I don't believe these Ba'athists have enough of an appealing ideology that they can regenerate their own ranks."
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